• Choice of protocols from app layer to link layer
• Choice of radio/other technology (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.15. 4, …) IETF typically focuses just on this layer
Internet-connected smart objects are even harder
• Besides all of the other issues, there's
• Internet protocols to deal with • Corresponding attacks to deal with • More privacy issues to deal with (e.g., jurisdiction-specific legal requirements) 8 There's still tradeoffs of putting IP in smart objects
• If you DO put IP in a smart object:
• You have to devote resources (code/memory/power) to it that might be desirable for other device functionality • You have to worry about securing IP from the Internet
• If you DON'T put IP in a smart object:
• You usually need an Application-Layer Gateway (ALG) deployed • You might end up reinventing things IETF already did • You can't leverage the large ecosystem of IP-based knowledge, tools, etc. • Device talks directly to another local device (often smart phone or a wearable)
• Security & trust often based on direct relationship between the devices (pairing) • Rarely uses IP today but apps instead directly sit over link layer protocol
• Bluetooth, Z-Wave, ZigBee, … 
Summary of Lack of Standardization
• Information/data models for various types of smart objects
• Often outside scope of IETF, except for general connectivity models • There's lots of other forums in this space
• "The nice thing about standards is that you have so many to choose from." -Tanenbaum • See also http://xkcd.com/927/
• App-layer mechanism to configure Wi-Fi (etc) settings
• WiFi Alliance has WPS but not ubiquitously accepted • Using browser with web server in device avoids "need" to standardize • Still some desire for common mechanisms, but unclear where it best belongs
• Smart objects today often compete on time-to-market
• Standardization seen as too slow
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Effect on End-to-End
• IAB RFC 1958: "the goal is … intelligence is end to end rather than hidden in the network"
• But the smallest of constrained devices need "proxies, gateways, or servers" for Internet communication
• IAB RFC 3724: "Requiring modification in the network … typically more difficult than modifying end nodes"
• But can be expensive to put a secure software update mechanism in a smart object 22 
Total Cost of Ownership
We care most about this.
… if it results in savings here … (e.g. sophisticated power management)
But it can make sense to spend more here … (e.g., on flash/RAM, CPU, BOM) = + + 
Examples of Problems
Understanding the distributed nature of the development process is essential for tackling security problems.
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Security Recommendations (IETF)
• Key management: RFC 4107 discusses the trade-off between manual and automatic key management and recommends the use of automatic key management.
• RFC 7258 argues that protocols should be designed such that they make Pervasive monitoring significantly more expensive or infeasible (such as by using opportunistic security -RFC 7435).
• draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility argues for the ability to migrate from one algorithm to another over time (called Crypto Agility).
• Randomness requirements and key length recommendations subsequent slide
• Also available are protocol-specific recommendations 
Randomness Requirements
• RFC 4086 -"Randomness Requirements for Security" • Security protocols frequently use random numbers for
• Nonces for use with authentication and to avoid replay protection
• Key transport
• Asymmetric key generation (e.g., ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pairs)
• Signature algorithms based on El Gamal
• Unfortunately, most sources of randomness available at laptops and desktop PCs are not available at embedded systems.
• Startup clock time in nanosecond resolution, input events, disk access timings, IRQ timings.
• The danger is that there is little (to no) randomness in embedded systems, as observed by Nadja Heninger et al. and Kenneth Paterson et al.
Key Length Requirements
The chosen key length impacts security and performance.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] recommends at least 112 bits symmetric keys. A 2013 ENISA report states that an 80bit symmetric key is sufficient for legacy applications but recommends 128 bits for new systems. ECC offers better performance than RSA for the same level of security taking over-the-wire bandwidth into account. For this reason, there is a preference for use of ECC with IoT protocols.
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Learn from Attacks
• Selected attacks to illustrate common problems:
• Limited software update mechanism • Missing key management • Inappropriate access control • Missing communication security • Vulnerability to physical attacks
• Don't forget to secure the server-side as well.
According to the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) this is the #1 security vulnerability.
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Limited Software Update Mechanism
• In a presentation at the Chaos Communication Congress in December 2014 a security vulnerability of devices implementing the TR69 protocol, which also provides a software update mechanism, was disclosed.
• Real problem: Fix released in 2005 by AllegroSoft already but has not been distributed along the value chain of chip manufacturers, gateway manufacturers, Internet service providers.
• What happens when vendors do not support certain products anymore? Do IoT devices need a "time-to-die"/"shelf-life"?
• In January 2014 Bruce Schneier published an article where he expresses concerns about the lack of software update mechanisms in IoT deployments.
• Example: LIFX -Internet connected light bulb
• The attack revealed that an AES key shared among all devices to simplify key management.
• The firmware image was extracted via JTAG using a Bus Blaster. Then, the firmware was analyzed using IDA Pro. To find IoT devices connected to the Internet global scans have been used, for example, using ZMap. Similar problems have been seen with various other appliances, such as surveillance cameras, baby monitoring cameras and gas stations. Lacking access control to configuration files can cause problems for the entire system, as demonstrated with attacks against industrial control systems. 
